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I. INTRODUCTION
Outer space is, for the lack of a better term, big.1 Though the same holds
true for the volume of space2 around Earth, inadequacies in the current
body of international space jurisprudence and the finite options available for
satellite acquisition services present a unique threat to the long-term
sustainability of geospace.3 Foundationally, the architects of the Corpus Juris
Spatialis—the five multilateral space treaties—perceived space as an infinite
ocean of opportunity and sought to provide an equitable regime for
unabated exploration, use, and enjoyment of the cosmos.4 Anyone capable
and willing was—and remains—free to benefit from any manner of activity
1. DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 76 (1979).
2. This Comment focuses exclusively on “geospace,” a region above Earth in which objects
maintain relatively consistent orbits with the aid of Earth’s gravitational pull. See Bhavya Lal &
Emily Nightingale, Where is Space? And Why Does That Matter?, in SPACE TRAFFIC MGMT. CONF.,
Paper 16 at 1 n.1 (2014) (delineating between various regions of space); see also R.A.N. Araujo et al.,
Sphere of Influence and Gravitational Capture Radius: A Dynamical Approach, 391 MONTHLY NOTICES
ROYAL ASTRONOMICAL SOC’Y 675, 675 (2008) (“The concept of the sphere of influence [is] . . . the
region in which the gravitational influence of a body prevails over the gravitational influence of other
bodies.”). The majority of space activity is concentrated in this “bubble” around Earth. See infra
Appendix.
3. See Mary Button, Note, Cleaning Up Space: The Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty as a Model
for Regulating Orbital Debris, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 539, 539 (2013) (“The space near
Earth, the orbit, is different from any other place in the universe due to its proximity to our planet and
the impact humans have on the area. Humanity needs to stop thinking of the planet’s orbit as just a
part of the vastness of space[.]”).
4. See Rep. of the Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on Its Sixty-Second Session,
at 50, U.N. Doc. A/74/20 (2019) [hereinafter COPUOS, Sixty-Second] (“[O]uter space should remain
an operationally stable and safe environment that is maintained for peaceful purposes and open for
exploration, use and international cooperation by current and future generations, in the interest of
all . . . .”).
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in space, so long as the spacefarer operates through peaceful means.5 Yet
conceptually, “outer space” is distinguishable from “geospace” in that
geospace is slowly approaching a modern-day tragedy of the commons.6
Within the region of geospace, the prime utility lies with satellite orbits—
a finite commodity.7 Since 1957, mankind has placed approximately
9,453 objects into Earth orbit.8 Annually, geospace acquires an average of
150 satellites9 providing valuable scientific data and transmission services
vital to our development on Earth.10 This steady accumulation accelerated
5. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. IV, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (prohibiting States Parties from placing weapons in
orbit or using celestial bodies for ill-intentioned purposes).
6. The tragedy of the commons occurs when utilization of land is unbounded, and persons
exploit the land to the extent of their own self-interest with remorseless disregard of the possibility that
others might do the same, despite the resource’s finite utility. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1248 (1968) (concluding legal solutions rather than technical solutions will
prevent a tragedy of the commons); see also Benjamin David Landry, A Tragedy of the Anticommons: The
Economic Inefficiencies of Space Law, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 523, 577 (2013) (“The commercialization of
outer space is suffering from a tragedy of the anticommons. No state or private entity has been willing
to bear the cost of commercialization because international law prohibits national and, potentially,
private appropriation[.]”); Scott J. Shackelford, Governing the Final Frontier: A Polycentric Approach in
Managing Space Weaponization and Debris, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 429, 443 (2014) [hereinafter Shackelford,
Governing the Final Frontier] (“Technological advancements and resource scarcity are driving interest in
the space commons, yet thus far governance has failed to keep pace.”); Scott J. Shackelford, The Tragedy
of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 109, 111 (2009) [hereinafter Shackelford,
Tragedy of the Common Heritage] (“[I]n particular the communal property principle of the [Common
Heritage of Mankind] are under pressure with the need for greater private economic development.
With resources becoming increasingly scarce and technology advancing to meet surging demand,
longstanding principles of communal property in the international commons will either be
reinterpreted or rewritten outright.”).
7. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Sci. & Tech. Subcomm. on Its
Fifty-Fourth Session, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2017/CRP.12 (2017) [hereinafter COPUOS,
Fifty-Fourth]. Accordingly, in support of Mary Button, it is the author’s view that international space
law should be bifurcated, with separate regimes for outer space and geospace, yet for markedly different
reasons. See generally Button, supra note 3, at 539–40 (advocating for a protocol to the space treaties
that mirrors the Antarctic Treaty’s Montreal Protocol). Contra Definition and Delimitation of Outer
Space and the Character and Utilization of the Geostationary Orbit, 2001 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 12, § C(4) at 721 (“[D]elimiting outer space is not necessary.
No legal or practical problems have arisen in the absence of such a definition.”).
8. As of April 30, 2020, roughly 5,841 objects occupy geospace. See Online Index of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF.,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/index.jspx?lf_id= (follow “To Search the Online Index,
Click Here,” then toggle filters) (last Apr. 30, 2020).
9. COPUOS, Fifty-Fourth, supra note 7, at 9.
10. Id. at 12 (“[Peaceful usage of outer space] is also integral in contributing to governance
mechanisms in addressing a wide array of global problems, for example, monitoring climate change
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abruptly with the advent of satellite constellations. In 2019 alone,
457 satellites were added to the geospace environment. This only
exacerbates the accumulation of space debris, arguably the most dangerous
byproduct of space activity.11 And despite the ample treaty bodies, the
textual vagaries12 present spacefarers an opportunity to devour the usability
of geospace without internalizing the negative externalities of their usage.13
In consideration of our global dependence on satellite-based
communication, remote sensing, and simply having a gateway to outer
space, the current legal framework is unsustainable and requires binding
international cooperation rather than voluntary, nebulous guidelines.14

and providing early warnings for natural disasters through the use of satellite images, supporting local
development through connecting communities to the internet, and providing the infrastructure
necessary for development in information technology industry.”).
11. See STUFF IN SPACE, stuffin.space (last visited Apr. 26, 2020) (click on any dot, then click
“Find all objects from this launch.” Or, click “Groups” to view various satellite constellations)
(providing an interactive interface to view all current objects, including space debris and non-functional
objects, in Earth orbit).
12. In this context, spacefaring nations take advantage of the gaps and ill-defined language of
the space law treaties to skirt the responsibility of protecting the global commons. Essentially, the
treaties are exploited, not necessarily space. Though the byproduct of this interpretive exploitation
and the lack of holistically internalized mitigation procedures exhibits the threat to the geospace
commons. See generally Frans G. von der Dunk, Too-Close Encounter of the Third Party Kind: Will the Liability
Convention Stand the Test of the Cosmos 2251-Iridium 33 Collision?, 28 SPACE CYBER & TELECOMM. L. 199
(2010) (discussing the difficulties of assigning liability for satellite collision due to vagaries within the
Liability Convention and failure to comply with the Registration Convention).
13. Due to the inability to appropriate property in space and the absence of resource use
delimitation, any entity with the financial means can exploit geospace resources. Landry, supra note 6,
527–28; see also Joseph Kurt, Note, Triumph of the Space Commons: Addressing the Impending Space Debris
Crisis Without an International Treaty, 40 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 305, 309 (2015)
(criticizing China’s blatant use of an anti-satellite missile to destroy its own faulty satellite).
14. The tragedy of the commons occurs when utilization of land is unbounded, and persons
exploit the land to the extent of their own self-interest with remorseless disregard of the possibility that
others might do the same despite the resource’s finite utility. See Hardin, supra note 6, at 1248
(concluding legal solutions rather than technical solutions will prevent a tragedy of the commons); see
also Landry, supra note 6, at 577 (“The commercialization of outer space is suffering from a tragedy of
the anticommons. No state or private entity has been willing to bear the cost of commercialization
because international law prohibits national and, potentially, private appropriation[.]”); Shackelford,
Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 111 (“[I]n particular the communal property principle of
the [Common Heritage of Mankind] are under pressure with the need for greater private economic
development. With resources becoming increasingly scarce and technology advancing to meet surging
demand, longstanding principles of communal property in the international commons will either be
reinterpreted or rewritten outright.”); Shackelford, Governing the Final Frontier, supra note 6, at 443
(“Technological advancements and resource scarcity are driving interest in the space commons, yet
thus far governance has failed to keep pace.”).
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To cure a tragedy of the commons, Garrett Hardin’s classic economic
solution entails either (1) establishing articulable property rights or
(2) promulgating coercive regulatory regimes.15 International law poses
obvious difficulties for implementing such solutions due to the contractual
nature of treaties.16 Fortunately, most launching states and indirect
beneficiary nation-states consented to the Outer Space Treaty (OST) and
the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects (Liability Convention), with the continued accession of remaining
nation-states.17 In terms of the international community’s sentiments
towards rectifying environmental degradation, protocols to the OST and
Liability Convention could conceivably reflect the changing attitudes toward
sustainability and emerging international custom.18 Yet any Hardin-esque
solution affecting a new property regime would directly contravene the
object and purpose of the Corpus Juris Spatialis.19 As such, a workable
15. See Hardin, supra note 6, at 1247 (discussing the behavioral effects of taxation and private
property regimes).
16. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 9, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(denoting the consent of all States requirement to adopt a treaty).
17. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its
Fifty-Seventh Session, at 10, U.N. Doc A/AC.105/C.2/2018/CRP.3 (2018) [COPUOS,
Fifty-Seventh].
18. Cf. Kurt, supra note 13, at 320–22 (evidencing international environmental cooperation
signals hope for restoration even without treaties); David Tan, Towards a New Regime for the Protection of
Outer Space as the “Province of All Mankind”, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 145, 177–79 (2000) (extending the
emerging custom of sustainable development to the space environment). The global commons of
Antarctica faced concerns similar to those in outer space, and the OST is modeled after a significant
portion of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). See Shackelford, Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra
note 6, at 141 (“The governing treaties of space law share many similarities with . . . the ATS.”). The
ATS also prohibits sovereign appropriation and weapons proliferation and covenants to ensure any
usage be purely scientific in nature and equitably shared with the global community. The Antarctic
Treaty art. I–III, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. Analogous to the OST, the ATS failed
to provision for sustainable usage and once mining operations threatened its environmental integrity,
a protocol to the ATS was annexed to arrest the potential destruction of Antarctica. Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty art. 7, Oct. 4, 1991, T.I.A.S. No. 98-114, 20 I.L.M.
1455 [hereinafter Madrid Protocol].
19. Holistically, the object and purpose of the Corpus Spatialis prohibits sovereign nations from
asserting ownership over any location or volume of space in the interest of maintaining a commons
for all of mankind. E.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at pmbl. & art. II (“Reaffirming the
importance of international co-operation in the field of activities in the peaceful exploration and use
of outer space . . . .”). In spite of the OST’s anti-appropriation clause, the International
Telecommunications Union is tasked with the responsibility to:
[E]ffect allocation of bands of the radio-frequency spectrum, the allotment of radio frequencies
and the registration of radio-frequency assignments and, for space services, of any associated
orbital position in the geostationary-satellite orbit or of any associated characteristics of satellites
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solution must balance contemporary global interests with intergenerational
equity.20
This Comment proposes a regulatory solution through the
implementation of a conceptual liability regime. This proposal finds support
through emerging custom and the values systems which inform the
perceived utility of the global commons for all of mankind. It proffers a
workable solution that allows continued accessibility to geospace while
simultaneously coercing spacefaring entities and Earth-side beneficiaries
alike to incorporate reasonable care, aggressive debris clean-up solutions,
and binding mitigation procedures.21 Sovereign nations and private
corporations need not abate their participation in geospace but must not
encroach humanity’s future enjoyment of the “final frontier.”22 This
proposal addresses the coterminous interests of stakeholders, incorporating
equitable benefit-sharing without placing undue liability on the space
majors, such as the United States, Russia, and China.23
in other orbits, in order to avoid harmful interference between radio stations of different
countries.
International Telecommunications Union Const. art 1(2)(a) adopted by Plenipotentiary Conference
(Minneapolis, 1998).
20. Cf. Tan, supra note 18, at 175 (“Although the content of the ‘province of all mankind’ is
disputed, it nevertheless, at a minimum, imposes a duty upon states to use outer space in a manner that
jeopardizes neither the interests of present spacefaring states nor the potential interests of other
states.”).
21. Many mitigation standards exist, but the United Nations guidelines are non-binding. See
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, COMPENDIUM: SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION
STANDARDS ADOPTED BY STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 56 (2018) [hereinafter
COMPENDIUM: SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION], http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/s
d/Space_Debris_Compendium_COPUOS_21_sep_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KRP9-74UH]
(“Through resolution 62/217, the United Nations General Assembly invited Member States of the
United Nations to implement those voluntary guidelines through relevant national mechanisms ‘to the
greatest extent feasible,’ through space debris mitigation practices and procedures.”). Though
nation-states have domestic laws, those laws still lack enforcement mechanisms and do not create any
duty to mitigate the further creation of space debris. E.g., 51 U.S.C. § 31501 (2010) (enabling NASA
administrator to take steps to reduce risk of orbital debris). The United States, for example, grants
regulatory authority to various executive agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), to regulate space activities under its authority. See 14 C.F.R. § 400.1 (2019)
(enabling FAA to license space launches and re-entries); 47 C.F.R. § 25.108 (2018) (enabling FCC to
allocate satellite radio frequencies); 15 C.F.R. § 960.1 (2006) (enabling NOAA to regulate licenses for
private remote sensing satellites).
22. Shackelford, Governing the Final Frontier, supra note 6, at 430; Star Trek: The Original Series
(NBC television broadcast Sept. 8, 1966).
23.
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First, a separate regime must be established for geospace. Part II
provides a historical overview of space law, exploring the progressive
delimitation of airspace which carefully balanced the interests of
stakeholders. Second, it is crucial to understand the vulnerabilities of our
aging body of space law, and the specific challenges arising from the
privatization of space activity. Part III examines the textual limitations of
the treaties, domestic statutory schemes, and the voluntary international
standards for space debris mitigation. Third, equal weight must be given to
both public and private interests, but any rights conferred necessitates
counterbalancing those duties.
Part IV analyzes what motivates
nation-states to consent to binding international legal conventions and
combines those behavioral realities with Hardin’s coercion theory to
effectuate a practical liability regime. Finally, environmental security
discourse must include the rising threat of space debris. Part V concludes
with a summary of current decontamination efforts and the path of least
resistance to a global liability regime.
II. THE PROGRESSIVE DELIMITATION OF AEROSPACE
The Cold War marked a monumental shift in modern space law
development, but scholars often overlook its true beginnings.24 Indeed, the
primordial maxim of ad coelum et ad infernos25 marks the genuine

International cooperation, while taking into particular account the needs of developing countries,
should aim, inter alia, at the following goals, considering their need for technical assistance and
rational and efficient allocation of financial and technical resources: (a) Promoting the
development of space science and technology and of its applications; (b) Fostering the
development of relevant and appropriate space capabilities in interested States; (c) Facilitating the
exchange of expertise and technology among States on a mutually acceptable basis.
G.A. Res. 51/122, annex ¶ 5, Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs
of Developing Countries (Dec. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Benefits Declaration].
24. See Landry, supra note 6, at 528 (signifying Cold War tensions as primary impetus for space
law); Shackelford, Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 143 (stating Sputnik initiated the
development of law of outer space); Daniel A. Porras, Comment, The “Common Heritage” of Outer Space:
Equal Benefits for Most of Mankind, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 143, 147–48 (2006) (chronicling President
Eisenhower’s response to the Sputnik launch, deeming space exploration as the mark of military
superiority).
25. Translated, the maxim, while not binding law, expresses the generalization that one owns
everything up to the sky and down to the center of Earth. Ad coelum et ad inferos, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); J. Joseph Cummings, Ownership and Control of Airspace, 37 MARQ. L. REV.
176, 176 (1953).
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commencement of space jurisprudence. As meager as the delimitation of
airspace seems, the historical progression of boundary demarcation resulted
out of necessity.
Prior to the 1900s, private property owners possessed an absolute right
to their property’s superadjacent airspace.26 After the advent of sustained
aeronautical flight, the United States Congress promulgated the Air
Commerce Act of 1926 (ACA), establishing the foundations of our modern
aerospace transportation network.27 The ACA, as amended by the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938,28 prescribes national airspace as part of the public
domain. Some viewed this demarcation as a subversion of the common law
property maxim and challenged the Act’s constitutionality in United States v.
Causby.29 In Causby, the Supreme Court rejected ad coelum et ad infernos,
deeming it unworkable for modern aviation.30 The Court reasoned that
economic development justified a delineation between private and public
rights, but only if public usage did not render private property
uninhabitable.31 This exemplifies the first delimitation of airspace rights,32
which balanced the interests of the competing stakeholders to ensure the
best use of the commons at issue.33
Consistent with the international community, the ACA also granted the
United States government exclusive sovereign authority over the nation’s

26. See Cummings, supra note 25, at 176 n.1 (discussing the first reported case to solidify the
principle that a property owner is entitled to the land as well as everything above and below).
27. Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568.
28. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, ch. 601, § 1107(i)(3), 52 Stat. 973, 1028.
29. Private landowners equated sovereignty over the airspace commons as a regulatory taking.
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258 (1946) (“The problem presented is whether respondents’
property was taken, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, by frequent and regular flights of
army and navy aircraft over respondents’ land at low altitudes.”).
30. Id. at 261.
31. See id. (“[T]hat doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a public
highway . . . . Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
trespass suits. . . . To recognize such private claims to airspace would clog these highways, seriously
interfere with their control and development in the public interest[.]”). The boundary of navigable
airspace is at an altitude where aircraft pass without unduly interfering the subjacent land or safety of
the aircraft in question. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2018).
32. The boundary of navigable airspace is at an altitude where aircraft pass without unduly
interfering the subjacent land or safety of the aircraft in question. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2018).
33. See Chad J. Pomeroy, All Your Air Right Are Belong to Us, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
277, 290 n.77 (2015) (“[The Causby court] chose a middle ground, limiting air rights to those that are
within ‘the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.’”).
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airspace.34 In the interest of national security, this second demarcation of
sovereign jurisdiction over superadjacent airspace35 empowered
nation-states to dictate the permissible uses of their navigable airspace, while
leaving international airspace free for peaceful uses.36 Yet, unlike the ACA,
jurists avoided declaring any substantive separation between air space and
outer space.37 Once engineers designed aircraft capable of crossing over
into “the ether . . . beyond the control of subadjacent states,”38
commentaries opined that once free from the atmosphere, any subsequent
conquest of the great beyond invoked consideration of “the heritage of
mankind.”39 The international community thus loosely defined the third
delimitation, the beginning of space, at the Kármán Line.40 With the
momentum of consensus on the upper limit of national sovereignty, the
34. Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, ch. 344 § 6, 44 Stat. 568, 572 (current
version at 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2018)).
35. Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 1–2, Apr. 14, 1947, 61 Stat. 1180,
15 U.N.T.S. 295.
36. Id. at art. 5. Foreign nationals can still obtain permission for “innocent passage” if
necessary. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, pt. II § 3 art. 17–19, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (stating “innocent passage of territorial waters” is applicable
to ships and aircraft).
37. Russian jurist, Zarzar Valentin Ananevich, did not believe in assigning definitions for
international altitude zones, leaving such up to principles of sovereignty. Stephen E. Doyle, A Concise
History of Space Law: 1910–2009, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
53RD IISL COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, YOUNG SCHOLARS SESSION 2 (Mark J.
Sundahl & V. Gopalakrishnan eds., 2010).
38. Id. at 4. The first scholarly writing with a strict focus on space law presupposed “the entire
area beyond the atmosphere would have to be considered free territory both on technical grounds
founded on the law of nature and for reasons of legal construction and policy.” Welf Heinrich, Air
Law and Space, 5 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 11, 67 (1958).
39. Doyle, supra note 37, at 4.
40. Despite the extensive debate on the true boundary and Jonathan C. McDowell’s recent
proposal to reduce its altitude, in the interest of brevity, the 100-kilometer Kármán Line will represent
the demarcation for this Comment. Compare Button, supra note 3, at 541, with Jonathan C. McDowell,
The Edge of Space: Revisiting the Karman Line, 151 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 668 (2018) (cataloguing the
arguments surrounding the Kármán Line and proposing the demarcation of space lies at an altitude of
eighty kilometers). The United Nations has taken a firm stance regarding the location of
geosynchronous orbit (GSO). In 1976, a convention comprised of the equatorial nation-states of
Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, Zaire and Brazil attempted to claim
sovereignty over GSO, asserting the valuable region was a natural resource of Earth. Declaration of
the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, adopted Dec. 3, 1976 (Bogota), available at
https://bogotadeclaration.wordpress.com/declaration-of-1976/ [https://perma.cc/F9D7-VQVU].
However, the international community expressly rejected the countries’ claims because they defied the
non-appropriation clause of the OST. Ferdinand Onwe Agama, Effects of the Bogota Declaration on the
Legal Status of Geostationary Orbit in International Space Law, 8 NNAMDI AZIKIWE U.J. INT’L L. & JURIS.
24, 25–27 (2017).
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international community next looked toward a legal regime for the
governance of space, but motivations were limited to prohibiting the
weaponization of space.41
A. The Outer Space Treaty
When the Soviet Union successfully placed Sputnik I into orbit in 1957,
preeminent legal minds were blinded by the national security issues
implicated by the “space race”; tempering fears of a potential “star war”
took priority over any other potentially dangerous situation in space.42
Cognizant of the potential military utility of the space commons,43 the
United Nations formed the Standing Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1959.44 Primarily, COPUOS focused attention
on maintaining peace in regions beyond the immediate control of
subadjacent nations and a means to ensure that spacefaring nations could
not appropriate any area of space out of neocolonial self-interest.45 In 1967,
these goals materialized with the OST, the first internationalized document
for space law.46
The object and purpose of the OST aims to ensure a global commons in
the interest of mankind for scientific research and economic
development,47 while simultaneously restricting the militarization of
space.48 The text expressly declared that “[o]uter space, including the Moon
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by other means.”49 While
41. See Doyle, supra note 37, at 1, 4 (“[O]ver flights of national territory at any speed or altitude
could involve threats to safety and security, and states have a right to defend and protect their national
integrity by any appropriate means available to them, “from the seizure of the crew . . . to reprisals of
all kinds.”).
42. Jijo George Cherian & Job Abraham, Concept of Private Property in Space—An Analysis, 2 J.
INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 211, 212 (2007).
43. Chester Ward, Projecting the Law of the Sea into the Law of Space, 1957 JAG J. 3, 3 (1957) (“Are
the uses of space going to be primarily of military value—or will they be primarily of commercial
benefit?”).
44. Cherian & Abraham, supra note 42, at 212.
45. Years earlier, Arthur C. Clarke cautioned that “there must be an upper limit to national
sovereignty because otherwise ‘in the course of a day, [on a rotating globe] every country will lay claim
to a large portion of the Universe!’” Doyle, supra note 37, at 1, 5–6 (alterations in original).
46. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5.
47. See id. at pmbl. (“Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific
as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes[.]”).
48. Id.
49. Id. at art. II.
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denouncing any means of acquiring property in outer space, COPUOS
granted freedom for unabated, albeit peaceful, use of shared resources.
However, this allowance failed to consider the unique characteristics of
space.50 While outer space is theoretically infinite, in contrast, objects in
geospace congregate within a confined region specifically due to orbital
mechanics.
Further, the OST severely lacks language addressing sustainability and any
flexibility for future technological developments.51 As spacefaring
capabilities advanced, the Corpus Juris Spatialis increased with four additional
treaties between 1968 and 1979 that governed liability for accidents,52 duties
to assist in the rescue and return of persons and spacecraft,53 registration
obligations,54 and a notably unsuccessful framework for resource recovery
on the Moon.55 Each successive document echoed the object and purpose
50. COPUOS, Fifty-Fourth, supra note 7, at 12. It seems as though COPUOS relied on the
magnitude of space as a fail-safe for resource management.
51. COPUOS also failed to consider the positive utility of nuclear power as a fuel source, rather
than just a trump card for military engagement. See Jason Krause, The Outer Space Treaty Turns 50. Can
it Survive a New Space Race?, 103 A.B.A. J. 45, 46 (2017) (“The treaty . . . is a product of the Cold War
and primarily addresses concerns of that era, including nuclear war. So for 50 years, the treaty has
prevented belligerent nations from putting weapons of mass destruction into space.”). Considering
the insurmountable distance between celestial destinations from Earth, nuclear technology comprises
the bulk of current research and development efforts, ironically adverse to the original purposes behind
the OST. Compare John Wenz, NASA Targets Next-Gen Nuclear Reactors for Spacecraft, Space Colonies,
ASTRONOMY.COM (Sept. 17, 2018), http://www.astronomy.com/news/2018/09/next-gen-nuclearreactors-may-power-nasa-spacecraft-and-space-colonies [https://perma.cc/SAP4-T435] (“I don’t
think we can expand into deep space without nuclear power[.] . . .’ says David Poston, who leads the
Kilopower team.”), with Krause, supra note 51, 46 (quoting then-U.S.-Representative-now-NASA
Administrator, Jim Bridenstine, “[f]ifty years ago . . . our main concern was nuclear proliferation”).
52. See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29,
1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention] (expanding on article VII of
the OST by addressing liability for space activity which could potentially damage the surface of Earth
and other objects in space).
53. See Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (responding to
the need to further develop duties of nations to provide assistance to space activity participants).
54. See Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 24, 1975,
28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (implementing duties to register all objects launched into space to
foster situational awareness).
55. See Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
pmbl., art. 4, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 (reiterating the object and purpose of the OST, but
providing a potential mechanism for surface and subsurface use of celestial bodies). Largely rejected,
the Moon Treaty does not boast international support because it endorses the appropriation of
resources under a tenuous benefit-sharing regime. COPUOS, Fifty-Seventh, supra note 17 at 10. An
amendment to the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) similarly implements a benefit-sharing
mechanism for resources recovered in international waters but remains unratified by the United States
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of the OST and refrained from establishing a separate regime for geospace
specifically.
III. A TRAGEDY OF THE GEOSPACE COMMONS
The common heritage of mankind anchors the governance of global
commons.56 While some scholars have yet to accept such verbiage as
international custom,57 others submit it as establishing an emerging
principle of jus cogens.58 Proponents suggest that because “mankind”
replaces the typical language of “all States,” then any mention of “mankind”
insists humanity must be able to enjoy the collective benefits of resources
within a global commons.59 As a result, mankind itself has become the

Senate. The Senate’s reluctance lies in national security concerns and the potential to create unwanted
precedent for resource recovery operations in space. Kristina Wong, Rumsfeld Still Opposes Law of Sea
Treaty, WASH. POST (June 14, 2012), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/14/
rumsfeld-hits-law-of-sea-treaty/ [https://perma.cc/RN5D-KQ6S].
56. The principle clearly exists within the text of UNCLOS and the OST. Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 5, at pmbl.; UNCLOS, supra note 36, at pt. XI § 2 art. 136. While the ATS has traces of the
principle it is not entirely clear whether Antarctica’s global commons falls within the scope of the
common heritage of mankind. But when compared to the five generally accepted principles mentioned
in this section, it seems more likely than not that Antarctica is subject to the common heritage of
mankind due to the provisions concerning benefit-sharing, non-appropriation, nonproliferation, and
the subsequent sustainability protections afforded by the Madrid Protocol. But see generally Jeffrey Loan,
The Common Heritage of Mankind in Antarctica: An Analysis in Light of the Threats Posed by Climate Change,
1 N.Z.Y.B. INT’L L. 149 (2004) (pointing to the existence of the common heritage of mankind
principles in the ATS but arguing against any definitive proof).
57. See Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind,
35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 190, 199 (1986) (“The [Common Heritage of Mankind] must remain only a
conceptual ideal, not an international legal reality supported by State practice.”).
58. See Tare C. Brisibe, Customary International Law, Arms Control and the Environment in Outer Space,
8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 375, 389 (2009) (“It is even possible to go further in this direction and affirm
that the fundamental principles of [the OST] have become preemptory norms of general international
law/jus cogens accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole.”); Rüdiger
Wolfrum, The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 43 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 312, 316–17
(1983), http://www.zaoerv.de/43_1983/43_1983_2_a_312_337.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRJ6-CJVT]
(discussing the common heritage of mankind principle in relation to UNCLOS, equating the Sea-Bed
Authority to a representative of mankind). It seems illogical to deny jus cogens status to any global
commons as the common heritage of mankind, particularly when the treaty bodies governing such
commons boast extensive ratification or signature. Contra Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The
Common Heritage of Mankind Principle vs. The First in Time, First in Right, Rule of Property, 69 J. AIR L. &
COM. 689, 706 (2004) (concluding the improbability of the validity of the common heritage of mankind
principle due to the polarized interests of developed and developing nations). Despite the cleavages
that exist between developing and developed nations, geospace provides benefits to all of mankind,
whether directly or indirectly.
59. As Rüdiger Wolfrum explains:
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“one to dispose of . . . resources,” and upon invoking the interest of
mankind “the interests of future generations have to be respected in making
use of [resources].”60 One can analogize this position to property principles
against waste in the context of a present interest holder’s duty to vested
future interests.61 In summarizing the five shared conceptions of the
common heritage of mankind principle, Dr. Shackleford provides support
to this construction:
First, there can be no private or public appropriation of the commons.
Second, representatives from all nations must manage resources since a
commons area is considered to belong to everyone. Third, all nations must
actively share in the benefits acquired from exploitation of the resources from
the common heritage region. Fourth, there can be no weaponry or military
installations established in commons areas. Fifth, the commons should be
preserved for the benefit of future generations.62

Logically following, the OST’s presentment of outer space as the common
heritage of mankind grants an implied property right to all persons in the
geospace commons. Applying Dr. Shackleford’s principles, the credible

This term provokes several questions: Does this constitute a new subject of international law?
Would it be possible to argue that the interests of mankind have to be distinguished from the
interests of all States? Or does the term ‘mankind’ indicate that the interests of those parts of
mankind have to be taken into account which are not represented by the very States? The
documents available are silent on these questions with one exception. The Convention on the
Law of the Sea mentions [mankind] as potential beneficiaries of the utilization of the sea—and
this should be regarded as a logical conclusion to be drawn from the term ‘mankind’—also
peoples who have not attained full independence or other self-governing status.
Wolfrum, supra note 58, at 318.
60. See id. at 317–18 (referring to the joining of “mankind” and “heritage” language in the OST).
61. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 13, topic 2 § 204(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1936)
(“[Owner of present interest] shall not intentionally inflict harm upon the owner of such future
interest[.]”); see Wolfrum, supra note 58, at 318–19 (arguing the utilization of resources within a global
commons requires recovery activities to limit undue waste of resources and a mechanism for protecting
the environment).
62. Shackelford, Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 111 (citations omitted); see also
Jennifer Frakes, Notes and Comments: The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the Deep Seabed, Outer
Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise?, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 409,
412–13 (2003) (cataloguing the common five elements of the common heritage principle represented
in non-appropriation, common management, benefit sharing, peaceful purposes, and preservation for
future generations).
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treaties63 operate in tandem with the non-appropriation, nonproliferation,
and equitable benefit-sharing elements of the common heritage principle.
Permanently enjoining claims of sovereignty thus prohibits the
establishment of exclusive economic rights and reinforces equitable
benefit-sharing.64 However, the lack of resource management and
preservation language disallows mankind a mechanism to protect its interest
in the geospace commons if its usage results in damage, waste, or
destruction of its resources.65
A. Orbital Utility
In the context of orbital real estate, spacefaring entities formulate satellite
acquisition strategies for either low earth orbit (LEO) or geosynchronous
orbit (GSO).66 While each particular orbit can accommodate most space
objects,67 satellite positioning requires careful consideration due to the

63. With less than 20 parties to the treaty, the Moon Treaty is considered a categorical failure.
Cf. Shackelford, Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 158 (“It remains legally unclear whether
such activity [under the Moon Treaty] is allowed under established space law.”).
64. The exclusive economic zones under the UNCLOS regime is a key point of contention for
the United States.
65. Within the context of law and economics, if a property interest is efficiently assigned it will
afford the interest holder a procedure for protecting those interests, either through payment of
damages, granting an injunction, or special negotiation. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.
L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960) (examining the effect of the delimitation of property rights on the ability to
negotiate).
66. For brevity, this Comment will focus on these two broad orbits, though other orbits exist,
such as highly eccentric orbit, medium earth orbit, escape orbit, and various subtypes. ESA’s Annual
Space Environment Report, EUR. SPACE AGENCY 5 (May 18, 2018) [hereinafter ESA’s Annual Report],
https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T2B9-GM6N]. Geosynchronous and geostationary are used interchangeably, but
for the purposes of this Comment, the geosynchronous nomenclature will suffice. Both orbital
horizons allow a satellite to remain above a fixed point; geostationary orbits merely lie on the same
plane as the equator. See Lawrence D. Roberts, A Lost Connection: Geostationary Satellite Networks and the
International Telecommunication Union, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1101 n.30 (2000) (“The
determination of whether a satellite is geostationary or geosynchronous is one of degree rather than of
strict definition.”); Remote Sensing: Geosynchronous vs Geostationary Orbits, GISGEOGRAPHY (Feb. 23,
2018), https://gisgeography.com/geosynchronous-geostationary-orbits/ [https://perma.cc/2LQHU2NF]. Regardless of the terminology, sources referring to the geostationary orbit subtype equally
support arguments regarding geosynchronous orbit resource use.
67. For instance, large structures such as the late-Mir Space Station and the International Space
Station (ISS) can only feasibly reside in low earth orbit (LEO). Elizabeth Howell, Mir Space Station:
Testing Long-Term Stays in Space, SPACE.COM (Feb. 5, 2013), https://www.space.com/19650-mir-spacestation.html [https://perma.cc/46RZ-QBMX].
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distinct orbital mechanics appurtenant to each orbit.68
1.

Low Earth Orbit

Objects in LEO orbit between 100 to 1,200 miles above Earth’s
surface.69 Because it is so “close,” LEO acquisition provides spacefarers a
lower cost option as launches require relatively low energy budgets to
achieve proper positioning.70 However, unlike GSO, LEO satellites are not
fixed above a targeted location, which necessitates the placement of multiple
satellites at various inclinations if a telecommunications operator intends to
provide uninterrupted service to its subscribers.71 In the past five years,
LEO has become riddled with massive satellite constellations, further
compounding the negative utility of LEO.72 To the dismay of the
International Space Station’s (ISS) residents, every piece of jettisoned launch
vehicle debris—whether rocket bodies, mission-related objects, or paint

68. Three Classes of Orbit, NAT’L AERONAUTICAL & SPACE ADMIN. (Sept. 4, 2009),
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/OrbitsCatalog/page2.php [https://perma.cc/7RV5-LB
7G].
69. Matt Williams, What is Low Earth Orbit?, UNIVERSE TODAY (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://www.universetoday.com/85322/what-is-low-earth-orbit/ [https://perma.cc/VH5M-22BF].
70. The advent of “CubeSats” has also increased coverage capabilities and lowered the cost of
satellite manufacturing, making LEO an attractive option for satellite internet services. Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Order on Reconsideration, In re Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New
Space Age, IB Docket No. 18-313, 33 FCC Rcd. 11352, 11353 (Nov. 19, 2018). Because of the
relatively short travel distance and fuel requirements, construction and habitation of the ISS makes
LEO the most economically feasible orbital location. Robert Frost, Why the International Space Station
Stay So Close to Earth, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2015, 12:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
quora/2015/12/09/why-the-international-space-station-stays-so-close-to-earth/#2d73a518477d
[https://perma.cc/5LXL-3P4M].
71. Telecommunications & Integrated Applications: Orbits, EUR. SPACE AGENCY,
http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Telecommunications_Integrated_Applications/Orbits%
20 [https://perma.cc/Q4C5-XGJE].
72. See generally Application for Authority to Launch and Operate a Non-Geostationary Satellite
Orbit System in Ka-Band Frequencies, IBFS File No. SAT-LOA-20190704-00057, Call Sign S3051
(July 4, 2019) (requesting authority to launch Amazon’s Kuiper System consisting of 3,236 satellites in
LEO); Memorandum Opinion, Order and Authorization, In re Space Exploration Holdings, LLC,
33 FCC Rcd. 11434 (Nov. 15, 2018) (addressing SpaceX’s proposal to add 7,518 more satellites to its
previously authorized constellation of 4,425 satellites); Order and Declaratory Ruling, In re WorldVu
Satellites Ltd., 32 FCC Rcd. 5366 (June 23, 2017) (approving OneWeb’s request for 720-satellite
constellation in LEO); see also Application for Modification, In re WorldVu Satellites Ltd., IBFS File
No. SAT-MOD-20180319-00022 (Mar. 19, 2018) (proposing increase of OneWeb’s satellite
constellation to 1,900 satellites).
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flecks73—resides in LEO.74 While most of these objects eventually find
their way into various decay or graveyard orbits, the transient status of debris
still poses a substantial threat to functional satellites and human lives.75
2.

Geosynchronous Orbit

To contrast, reaching GSO requires an increased energy budget,76 but
once attained, the orbital mechanics of GSO allows space objects to remain
stationary above one location throughout the object’s entire orbital transit,
with minimal requirements to adjust for perturbances caused by Earth’s
gravity.77 This stationary attribute creates incredible demand on GSO
acquisition services because, unlike LEO, only one satellite is necessary for
the same transmission services in GSO. But unlike LEO, the physics of
radio frequency allocation places spatial restrictions on the permissible
number of GSO satellites. Additionally, due to the distance between GSO
satellites and radio transmitters on Earth, only three suitable radio
frequencies exist.78 While these limitations prevent harmful radio
73. ESA’s Annual Report, supra note 66, at 3–4.
74. See SCOTT KELLY, ENDURANCE: MY YEAR IN SPACE, A LIFETIME OF DISCOVERY 397–
405 (2017) (recalling the notification of a “red late-notice conjunction” on the ISS, which signifies that
tracking devices missed an approaching piece of space debris but the temporal proximity renders
avoidance maneuvers an unavailable option); see also COPUOS, Fifty-Fourth, supra note 7, at 9
(“Moreover, by following the number of collisions recorded by the [ISS], and the number of times the
ISS has had to manoeuvre to avoid debris, one can see the true impact of these objects on space
operations.”).
75. Rubicon Global, Space Waste & Debris: The Biggest Problem We Can’t See?, RUBICON (Jan. 9,
2018) [hereinafter Space & Waste Debris], https://www.rubiconglobal.com/blog-space-waste-debris/
[https://perma.cc/W7DZ-33RX]; see also Matthew Shouppe, The IRAS/GGSE 4 Close Approach,
MEDIUM (Jan. 31, 2020), https://medium.com/@leolabs_space/the-iras-ggse-4-close-approacha99de19c1ed9 [https://perma.cc/9WP2-2YHD] (describing an incident on January 27th, 2020 when
two non-functioning satellites came within 18 meters of each other, at relative velocities of 32,900 miles
per hour).
76. See Rae Paoletta, Why SpaceX Won’t Be Landing Its Rocket Today, GIZMODO (May 16, 2017,
9:00 AM), https://www.gizmodo.com.au/2017/05/why-spacex-wont-be-landing-its-rocket-today/
[https://perma.cc/EJM8-DLJD] (“[B]ecause the payload is so heavy and geostationary orbit is at a
much higher altitude [than LEO], SpaceX has to use pretty much all its fuel to get its satellite in the
right spot.”).
77. Three Classes of Orbit, supra note 68. These adjustments are known as “stationkeeping.” E.g.,
T. S. Kelso, Basics of the Geostationary Orbit, SATELLITE TIMES (May 1998), http://www.celestrak.com/
columns/v04n07/ [https://perma.cc/3A25-7TXH].
78. See Roberts, supra note 66, at 1104 (describing the usage and limitations of C band, Ku band,
and Ka band frequencies); Telecommunications & Integrated Applications: Satellite Frequency Bands, EUR.
SPACE AGENCY (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Telecommunications_Integra
ted_Applications/Satellite_frequency_bands [https://perma.cc/J7K8-CQ9F] (identifying the
different frequency designations and their respective uses).
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interference, it inflates the scarcity of GSO slot availability.79 As a result,
GSO is the highest valued orbit available.80
B. Kessler Syndrome—Fueling the Tragedy
Today, over eighty sovereign actors and private organizations participate
in space activity.81 The OST’s Cold-War-inspired objectives failed to make
substantial allowances for future development, despite the cautions of such
short-sighted construction.82 Over-utilization evaded the immediate
concern of signatory nations because the then-current technology did not
lend itself to significant exploitation of analogous commons, such as the
oceans and Antarctica.83 Considering the dimensions of contemporary real
79. Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Const. art. 1(2)(a), adopted by Plenipotentiary Conference
(Minneapolis, 1998); see Roberts, supra note 66, at 1101 (“A variety of factors hinder the continued use
of the geostationary orbit. In particular, the medium is restricted by (1) the physical nature of the
geostationary orbit, (2) the industry’s technological capabilities, (3) the realities of the
telecommunication marketplace, and (4) regulatory limitations imposed by the international
community.”). Essentially, if an entity wants to acquire stationary positioning over the United States,
it must compete with similarly motivated entities. See Paul R. Portney & Molly K. Macauley, Slicing the
Geostationary Pie: Property Rights in Orbit, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (July 26, 1984),
http://www.aei.org/publication/slicing-the-geostationary-pie-property-rights-in-orbit/
[https://
perma.cc/EN74-MEXW] (“Once it has decided on slot-widths, how then does the FCC choose among
commercial applicants for these valuable pieces of galactic real estate? How does it decide between an
application for expanded service from a well-established satellite company and one for unique services
from an entrepreneurial newcomer? . . . [T]hrough an administrative process known as ‘allocation
under a public interest standard.’”).
80. Roberts, supra note 66, at 1101.
81. This activity includes operating meteorological, telecommunication, and global positioning
system (GPS) satellites, as well as activity on the ISS. See generally Online Index of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, supra note 8 (indexing known objects currently in space attributable to certain states or
organizations). Commercial participation is expected to grow substantially due to NASA’s plans to
privatize LEO and the ISS for purposes other than scientific research. NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE
ADMIN., NASA PLAN FOR COMMERCIAL LEO DEVELOPMENT TO ACHIEVE A ROBUST LOW-EARTH
ORBIT ECONOMY FROM WHICH NASA CAN PURCHASE SERVICES AS ONE OF MANY CUSTOMERS 5
(June 2019), https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/commleodevt_plan_6-7-19_final
-links-new.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7NU-NN59].
82. See Ward, supra note 44, at 3 (“Today neither lawyers nor governments are prepared to state
the legal flight rules applicable to presently operating rockets and planned satellites. For the second
time in the present century science and engineering have far out-stripped the law.” (quoting John Cobb
Cooper, Address before the American Society of International Law (Apr. 26, 1956))).
83. Shackelford, Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 120–21 (“[UNCLOS, ATS, and
the OST] were created during the Cold War at a time before technological progress fully opened up
these areas to economic activity.”). However, protocols and amendments subsequently shored up the
deficiencies in the ATS and UNCLOS text. Currently, all mining efforts are suspended in Antarctica
until 2048 unless a binding agreement to that effect enters into force. Madrid Protocol, supra note 18,
at arts. 7, 25(5). When technology outgrew the original provisions of UNCLOS, nation-states sought
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property, one can visualize the boundaries and confines of a tract of land.84
Even in the context of more abstract property interests, such as minerals or
the sea, one can envisage the inherent spatial limitations.85 Contrary to
Earth-side property, legal scholars proffer that space lacks tangible
parameters.86 This mischaracterization marks the point of departure
between the current sustainability of geospace and this Comment’s
proposed construct.87
The laws of astrophysics physically limit our ability to occupy geospace.
And because it is finite, every satellite launched into space adds a
corresponding negative utility to geospace.88 In 2019 alone,89 the potential
for an interruption capable of derailing any derivative benefit from space
drew ever closer—the essence of the tragedy of the commons.90 Without
a binding mitigation framework, continued satellite proliferation will only
catalyze the destruction of our correlative rights91 in the geospace
commons.
to recover mineral resources outside of their territorial waters, necessitating the creation of the
International Seabed Authority, which facilitates the operation of deep-sea mining enterprises. G.A.
Res. 48/263, annex, Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (Aug. 17, 1994). The following year, binding
conservation measures for vulnerable fish stocks became available for signature. Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, T.I.A.S. No. 01-1211. We are overdue for an update to
the Corpus Juris Spatialis.
84. For example, metes and bounds signify the finite extent of use and dominion over a set
acreage.
85. See Jordan Hanania, Kailyn Stenhouse & Jason Donev, Energy Education: Oil and Gas Traps,
UNIV. CALGARY, https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Oil_and_gas_traps [https://perma.cc/
NP4H-257W] (illustrating varieties of stratification where oil and gas deposits form, indicative of
physical confinement and an exhaustible nature of the resource).
86. See Shackelford, Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 141 (“What makes space
unique, however, is its status as the ultimate international commons, replete with infinite resources
sufficient to satisfy infinite demand.”).
87. Button, supra note 3, at 539–40.
88. Hardin, supra note 6, at 1244–45.
89. See Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space, supra note 8 (indicating 581 satellites were
added in geospace in 2019).
90. Hardin, supra note 6, at 1244–45.
91. Similar to the development of oil and gas law, space jurisprudence is sui generis, or “of its
own kind.” Sui generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Wm. E. Colby, The Law of Oil and
Gas: A Consideration of Landowners’ Rights, Particularly as Developed in California, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 357, 357
(1943). Parallel to oil and gas law’s use of ferae naturae in developing correlative rights, analogizing the
construct of correlative rights to the global commons in orbital space is an appealing corollary. See
Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 581–82 (Tex. 1948) (rejecting the wild-animal analogy but
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The 2017 Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS made a
chilling summary of the reality of the space debris threat when it explained:
More than 20,000 pieces of space debris the size of a tennis ball or larger orbit
the Earth with a velocity of nearly 17,500 mph. These uncontrolled fragments
and other debris (such as discarded rocket bodies, and retired satellites) can
collide with each other and generate more debris, in a cycle popularly known
as the “Kessler syndrome.” The Kessler syndrome in turn results in an
exponential growth of orbital debris as time progresses, with an
ever-increasing risk for operational bodies in orbit. In addition to their
number, these pieces of debris have enough energy to break the rigid wall of
satellites, and destroy satellites.92

Donald J. Kessler cautioned that we would eventually reach a tipping point,
triggering a chain reaction in near-Earth orbit of hypervelocity collisions93
that will trap humanity on Earth.94 Prospectively, because the “delay in
implementation of [debris mitigation] methods reduces their
effectiveness,”95 without comprehensive compliance, once Kessler
Syndrome begins, the result will likely revert our telecommunication abilities
back to the late 1800s. Yet self-interested parties continue to exploit highly
sought-after orbital resources.96

respecting its precursory benefit in developing the rule of capture and correlative rights). Though
correlative rights relate to interests in a mineral tract common to contiguous landowners, one could
analogize this construction to the common heritage of mankind to justify granting an equitable
opportunity to benefit from a common space resource. See Wolfrum, supra note 58, at 318 (“The
adoption of the term ‘mankind’ from the Outer Space Treaty taken together with the term ‘heritage’ at
least indicates that the interests of future generations have to be respected in making use of the
sea-bed.”).
92. COPUOS, Fifty-Fourth, supra note 7, at 9. These figures only represent the fragments
under direct observation from debris tracking devices. It is estimated that over 166 million pieces of
debris—ranging in size from 1 millimeter to 1 centimeter—reside in geospace, and regardless of size,
these tiny materials have the potential to vaporize objects upon collision. Space Debris by the Numbers,
EUR. SPACE AGENCY, (Jan. 2018) https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_
Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers [https://perma.cc/2J9M-WUBJ]; Donald J. Kessler & Burton
G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 J. GEOPHYSICAL
RES. 2637, 2639 (1978).
93. Kessler & Cour-Palais, supra note 92, at 2639–40.
94. Kurzgesagt–In a Nutshell, End of Space—Creating a Prison for Humanity, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25,
2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yS1ibDImAYU (last visited May 11, 2020).
95. Kessler & Cour-Palais, supra note 92, at 2645.
96. See Portney & Macauley, supra note 79 (discussing entities competing desires for a “slice” of
the “geostationary pie”).
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C. Domestic Legislation
One of the primary challenges jurists face when formulating international
standards for space activity lies with COPUOS, because the unanimous
support of its delegates is a prerequisite for concluding any multilateral
agreement.97 While the consensus method initially provided a great deal of
strength to the Corpus Juris Spatialis’s mandates, the Committee’s
ever-expanding membership has frustrated the adoption of any binding
principles and guidelines since the 1980s.98 Despite the dearth of
compulsory language, non-binding declarations of law inform us of the
likely trajectory toward binding agreements in the future. Even without
mandatory language, domestic legislation has mirrored COPUOS’s
instruments addressing mitigation efforts.99
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), and Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) serve key administrative functions in the mitigation of debris
attributable to U.S. space activity. Prior to the passage of the Spurring
Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015
(SPACE Act),100 NASA facilitated many of humanity’s first triumphs in
space faring and still plays an active role in tracking, cataloging, and
formulating debris mitigation standards in the U.S.101 The 2019 update to
these standards reflected the culmination of debris research, and sets
benchmarks on permissible debris creation.102 While NASA has long been

97. Eilene Galloway, Consensus Decisionmaking by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, 7 J. SPACE L. 3, 3 (1979).
98. GLOBAL SPACE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY 32 (Ram S. Jakhu & Joseph
N. Pelton eds., 2017); see generally INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW: UNITED NATIONS INSTRUMENTS
(U.N. Office of Outer Space Affairs, 2017) (compiling documents adopted by General Assembly since
1967).
99. Though this Comment focuses on U.S. law specifically, other nation–states have corollary
statutory schemes. For a more comprehensive review of other nation-states’ domestic legislation, see
COMPENDIUM: SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION, supra note 21.
100. Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, Pub.
L. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (codified in scattered sections of 51 U.S.C.).
101. NASA ACAD. OF PROGRAM/PROJECT & ENG’G LEADERSHIP, ORBITAL DEBRIS
MANAGEMENT & RISK MITIGATION §§ 2–3 (Daniel Connell et al. eds., 2012).
102. U.S. OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES
(2019). The Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP) consist of five objectives which
seek to (1) control debris release, (2) minimize the creation of new debris from accidents, (3) increase
capacities for better spacecraft design, (4) dictate methods for post-mission disposal of defunct
spacecraft, and (5) establish probability benchmarks for special mission—such as satellite
constellations—disposal plans. Id.
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one of the three major space agencies operating in space, the reality of
political cycles has forced NASA to look elsewhere to sustain project
funding and support of existing national laboratories, namely the ISS.103
Still, much of the commercial activity in space consists of NASA-awarded
government contracts for resupply missions, payload transport, and other
collaborative projects with other nations.104 However, in the last decade,
independent commercial activity has exploded. The SPACE Act thus
initiated the privatization of space, as commercial payloads are now being
launched into geospace unilaterally without any precursory relationship with
NASA, other than the occasional use of NASA launch facilities.105
In order to access space and place a satellite into orbit, a launching party
must obtain a launch license from the FAA,106 and an authorization for
103. Due to the cancellation of the Space Shuttle Program:
Between 2006 and 2018, NASA will pay Roscosmos approximately $3.4 billion to ferry 64 NASA
and partner astronauts to and from the ISS in its Soyuz spacecraft at prices ranging from
approximately $21.3 million to $81.9 million for each roundtrip.
The goal of the Commercial Crew Program is to foster an industry that would meet the
Agency’s needs as well as those of other Government and nongovernmental entities. As of May
2016, NASA had spent approximately $3.4 billion on this effort. The final phase of this effort
began in September 2014 when NASA awarded the Space Exploration Technologies Corporation
(SpaceX) and The Boeing Company (Boeing) firm-fixed-price contracts to complete development
of their crew transportation systems and, assuming they meet the Agency’s safety and
performance requirements, receive certification to begin flying astronauts to the ISS on a regular
basis.
NASA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., IG-16-028 (A-15-010-00), NASA’S COMMERCIAL CREW
PROGRAM: UPDATE ON DEVELOPMENT AND CERTIFICATION EFFORTS 1 (2016).
104. For instance, all human transport to and from the ISS is on the Russian Soyuz which
launches from and re-enters the atmosphere near the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Id. This,
in and of itself, is powerful evidence of the global interest in routine access to space, considering the
tenuous political relationship between the United States, Europe, and Russia.
105. SpaceX uses NASA’s 39A launch complex, but often lands its reusable rocket bodies on
two seaward barges—Of Course I Still Love You and Just Read the Instructions. It has also
constructed a private launch facility at Boca Chica Beach near the U.S.–Mexico border. About SpaceX,
BlueOrigin has
SPACEX, https://www.spacex.com/about [https://perma.cc/R3HJ-AQ8N].
constructed a launch facility near Van Horn, Texas and VirginGalactic has signed a twenty-year lease
to provide private space flights from Spaceport America in Truth or Consequences, New Mexico.
FAA OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSP., ANNUAL COMPENDIUM OF COMMERCIAL SPACE
TRANSPORTATION 29–30 (2017).
106. 14 C.F.R. § 413.3 (2019). As a prerequisite to licensure, the FAA reviews launch
applications for safety, potential environmental impact, liability exposure, and airspace integration of
the proposed launch and eventual orbital position. Id. pt. 415 app. B. Notably, the FAA requires a
debris analysis be submitted with license application materials, and licensees must ensure that any
debris jettisoned from any payload not come within 200 feet of another manned or mannable space object
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satellite radio frequency transmission from the FCC.107 Because
commercial space contractors have created business models that operate to
the exclusion of government contracts, this upsurge of private activity
affords the FCC a substantial level of influence over the future of geospace.
Aware of its normative power, the FCC proposed a rulemaking for updated
debris mitigation standards as part of its licensure reviews.108 But as part
of the current administration’s policies toward economic growth and
competition, the FCC’s efforts to create these new standards have been
“paused.”109 Without NASA oversight and the FCC’s final rule for
mitigation standards, COPUOS has become the only feasible avenue for
promulgating a framework that considers economic incentives in tandem
with intergenerational equity. Under Hardin’s analysis, coercive regulation
and management of the commons provide a workable solution to free us
from our current trajectory.110

during launch. Id. §§ 417.211; 417.107(e). As such, the FAA is specifically concerned with the safety
of humans rather than the lasting utility of geospace.
107. 47 C.F.R. § 25.115 (2019). The FCC is the domestic counterpart to the ITU and is
“responsible for managing and licensing the electromagnetic spectrum for commercial users” seeking
satellite acquisition services. Licensing, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/licensing-databases/licensing
[https://perma.cc/HL6B-9VSP]; see supra text accompanying note 19 (discussing the role of the ITU).
An application is reviewed concurrently by both the FCC and ITU to coordinate allocation of the radio
frequency spectrum. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 25.146(c) (requiring a satellite operator to obtain a finding
from the ITU that proposed frequency exposure limits are “favorable” prior to a satellite operator’s
utilization of assigned frequency in LEO).
108. Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age, 84 Fed. Reg. 4,742 (proposed Feb. 19,
2019).
109. Daniel Wilson, Commerce Asks FCC to Pause Space Junk Mitigation Rule, LAW360 (7:57 PM,
Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1148129/commerce-asks-fcc-to-pause-space-junkmitigation-rule [https://perma.cc/5W5T-EMQM]. Rather, the recent Space Policy Directive created
the Office of Space Commerce under the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the FCC has become
but a meager cog in the interagency wheel. The Space Policy Directive intends to consolidate the
launch and reentry process into the Department of Commerce, rather than across the FCC, the Federal
Aviation Administration, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Space Policy
Directive–2, 83 Fed. Reg. 24,901, 24,901 (May 24, 2018).
110. Hardin restates Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s maxim, “Freedom is the recognition of
necessity” to emphasize that assigning rights, such as property rights, forces society to abandon
flooding the commons without restraint, yet results in freedom from a self-inflicted demise. See Hardin,
supra note 6, at 1247–48 (illustrating the success of abandoning unabated commons usage by restricting
waste disposal that would otherwise have led to condemning an entire commons); Shackelford, Tragedy
of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 130 (“[O]nce occupation of a territory is possible, [regulations]
become necessary to catalyze development.”).
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IV. NECESSITY FOR REGULATION TO PRESERVE THE HERITAGE
OF MANKIND—A PROPOSAL
Conceptually, all persons hold an implied property right in the space
commons.111 As such, spacefaring entities and developing nations possess
an equitable right to access and use orbital resources.112 But the sui generis
nature of geospace presents a paradox requiring a unique regime for the
sustainable usage of its resources.113 The international community cannot
realize the advantages of the common heritage principle under a property
regime because any conceivable assignment would violate the
non-appropriation clause or unjustly enrich a particular interest.114 This
111. Accord Shackelford, Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 110 (“[T]heoretically, all
of humanity became the sovereign over the international commons.”).
112. Cf. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights pt. 1, art. 1, Jan. 1,
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (“1. All people have the right of self-determination. . . . 2. All people may, for
their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations
arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and
international law.”). Even though the United States has yet to ratify the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), its signature obligates it not to act in such a way that
would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra
note 16, at art. 18.
113. Aside from the limitations of LEO and GSO, it seems prudent to mention that satellites
can only maintain their orbital positions through small orbital maneuvers. Unlike conventional
airplanes which change altitude and speed without losing any degree of control, satellites cannot freely
move about the thermosphere or exosphere without compromising the utility of their permissible slots
or endangering the operation of neighboring objects. Alicia Ault, Ask Smithsonian: How Does a Satellite
Stay Up?, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonianinstitution/ask-smithsonian-how-does-satellite-stay-180954165/ [https://perma.cc/EP8W-AZNL]
(describing how satellites stay in orbit by counteracting the downward pull of Earth’s gravity with
forward momentum); cf. Roberts, supra note 66, at 1101 (“[F]or the purposes of most policy
discussions, the geostationary orbit can be considered a one-dimensional line describing a great circle
around the planet.”). Any excessive propulsion in the wrong direction could cause radio interference,
loss of a particular orbit, or an uncontrolled satellite. See generally Craig E. Roberts, The SOHO Mission
L1 Halo Orbit Recovery From the Attitude Control Anomalies of 1998, Proceedings of the Libration Point
Orbits and Applications Conference (Spain, 2002) (detailing the difficulty of maintaining halo orbits
and the potential adversities of over-propulsed satellites). Fundamentally, using geospace requires
spacefaring entities to occupy the resource for an extended period of time to realize any benefit from
their capital investment. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 192
(2014) (“[ITU] continues to consider limiting the duration of assignments, while recognizing the
importance of ensuring an adequate period of time for owners to amortize the investments that are
required to launch and operate satellites.”).
114. Some proposals unnecessarily burden the entities capable of reaching space with capital
investment but require a distribution of benefits to states that did not make a contribution to the
endeavor. Landry, supra note 6, at 540–42. Similarly inequitable proposals suggest property auctions,
awarding space realty based on a “monstrous” bureaucratic valuation mechanism. Id. at 558–560.
Another allocates property proportionate to a state’s Earth-side landmass. Id. at 546–50. Property

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020

23

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 51 [2020], No. 3, Art. 6

800

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:777

means that only regulatory solutions can protect the interests inherent in a
commons protected for the common heritage of mankind.
A. The Motivations for International Compliance
The crux of a workable treaty lies in the consent of the parties to the
agreement.115 Thereafter, signatories internalize the agreement’s object and
purpose into their domestic law, or in the case of international
organizations, into an institutional framework.116 To implement a binding
international instrument, we must therefore ask the question: Why do
nations follow international law,117 and how can we use those behavioral
realities to construct a workable framework to ensure geospace survives?118
regimes provide legal clarity and allow property owners a means to protect their interests through
damages, nuisance, or conversion claims. Definitive property rights force the internalization of
negative externalities, an ideal enforcement measure for space jurisprudence. See Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. R. 347, 348 (1967) (“A primary function of property
rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities.”). The ITU’s
allocation of orbital slots technically evades violation of the non-appropriation clause because it
provides a means for merely using orbital real estate, even though permissible use resembles that of a
leasehold. Accord Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Const. art. 44(2), adopted by Plenipotentiary Conference
(Minneapolis, 1998) (“In using frequency bands for radio services, Member States shall bear in mind
that radio frequencies and any associated orbits, including the geostationary-satellite orbit, are limited
natural resources and that they must be used rationally, efficiently, and economically . . . so that
countries or groups of countries may have equitable access to those orbits and frequencies, taking into
account the special needs of the developing countries.”) (emphasis added). Regardless of this
quasi-property right, the OST and Liability Convention do not adequately force the internalization of
externalities. One’s liability for damages is only invoked if sufficient evidence connects the space object
to the identity of the responsible party. Liability Convention, supra note 52, at art. X. For example, it
is nearly impossible to establish the origination of a bolt after hypervelocity impacts. Kessler &
Cour-Palais, supra note 92, at 2639. A more effective treaty would address the actual creation of debris.
Timothy Joseph Trapp, Note, Taking Up Space By Any Other Means: Coming to Terms With the
Nonappropriation Article of the Outer Space Treaty, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1681, 1693 (2013).
115. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 16, at art. 9.
116. See Benefits Declaration, supra note 23, at ¶ 2 (“States are free to determine all aspects of
their participation in international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space on an equitable
and mutually acceptable basis.”); Krause, supra note 51, at 48 (“[I]ncreasingly, nations are enacting
legislation and regulations for commercial space activity. ‘Space law is at the jagged edge between
legislative and executive power[.]’”). The European Space Agency, while not a sovereign nation, has
ratified the provisions of the Liability Convention, Rescue Agreement, and Registration Convention.
COPUOS, Fifty-Seventh, supra note 17, at 10.
117. However, some scholars suggest that this multifarious body of national and international
space law could work as the foundation for a workable mitigation regime. Shackelford, Governing the
Final Frontier, supra note 6 at 433–34, 433 n.30.
118. Compare HANNEKE VAN TRAA-ENGELMANN, COMMERCIAL UTILIZATION OF OUTER
SPACE: LAW AND PRACTICE 5–6 (1993) (“Preconditioned by the international and even universal
nature of outer space affairs, it was self-evident that international relations were bound to play a leading
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At the dawn of civilized society, depending on a particular jurisdiction’s
values, the laws of nature and morality compelled obedience and social
order.119 When nation-states concluded international agreements, it
represented the coalescence of the various values-based systems, the overlap
of which formed a universal understanding of the law of mankind.120
“[The] fundamental conceptual boundary between municipal and
international law . . . view[s] international law largely in terms of contractual
relations, therefore assigning to the ‘sovereign’ a central place in the
construction of the two orders.”121 In other words, transnational
cooperation operated through balancing the competing autonomy and
values of the parties involved. Despite centuries of debate, values systems
remain the principal motivating factor of compliance with international
law.122 Effective regulatory regimes must, therefore, strike at the heart of
what nation-states value the most, which is often related to national
security.123
When entering an international agreement, whether or not a nation-state
will ratify it informs us of the value a nation-state places on the instrument’s
subject matter. That value equates to the utility a nation-state places on
certain allowances or prohibitions.124 Incorporating these motivating
role in the regulation of the fourth environment and man’s activities therein.”), with Harold Hongju
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2600 (1997) (“[I]f we cannot predict
when nation-states will carry out their international legal obligations respecting trade retaliation,
environmental protection, human rights, global security, and supranational organizations, how can we
count on ‘multilateralism[.]’”).
119. Koh, supra note 118, at 2604–05 (detailing the religious influence on early legal systems).
120. However, the free-will of humanity explains the varied systems of law among nation-states.
Id. at 2606–07 (marking Hugo Grotius’ declarations of free will as the proverbial wedge driven between
sovereign concerns and those of the international community).
121. Id. at 2607.
122. See Terry Nardin, International Ethics and International Law, 18 REV. INT’L STUD. 19, 23–24
(1992) (“[C]ustomary international law reflects the inevitably plural character of international society
and may be said to constitute a morality of states, one that is a morality of coexistence.”). Three schools
of thought interpret the probability of compliance with international law. Koh, supra note 118,
at 2632–34. First, various rational choice theories proffer that compliance hinges on whether the
regulatory scheme will further the self-interest of parties involved. Id. at 2632–33. Second, liberal
international relations theories consider well-defined democratic institutions as the preferred
mechanism of enforcing rights and obligations. Id. at 2633. Third constructivism advances the theory
that rules and normative values are a direct reflection of the evolution of social interaction and shared
ideas which validate mechanisms ensuring peace and security. Id. at 2633–34.
123. Id. at 2658 (concluding that international regulatory schemes that cause nation-states to
internalize the object and purpose of an agreement as the best means to bolster adherence).
124. The Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocols on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer became the first treaty body in world history to achieve universal ratification. Most-Ratified
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factors with Hardin’s regulatory solution, any freedoms infringed upon must
manifest a higher utility than currently realized. If COPUOS proposes a
protocol for sustainable uses of space, the provisions must either have a
negligible effect on the global community’s perceived utility of space access
or substantially increase that utility. Assuming the propositioned regulatory
scheme aligns with the values system of each nation-state, the probability of
internalizing such regulations through domestic codification is high.
To ascertain the interests of nation-states, we must look to the factors
motivating current space utilization. Routine access to space undeniably
aids our technological advancement. The ISS’s antigravity environment
provides unique conditions to study medicine.125 Satellites provide
real-time tracking of environmental conditions and transmit crucial
information for disaster recovery planning.126 Space telescopes track
objects with the potential to cause the extinction of life of Earth.127 Free
from the veil of our hazy atmosphere, satellites can produce better imagery
and ascertain the composition of potential resource deposits on celestial
bodies.128 And simply receiving satellite imagery of our planet forces us to
confront the realities of our fragile existence. These benefits signify the
tangible realization of the OST’s object and purpose, which flow to all

International Treaties, U.N. BLOG (Sept. 24, 2012), https://blogs.un.org/blog/2012/09/24/mostratified-international-treaties/ [https://perma.cc/VT72-8QPV].
Beyond a reasonable doubt,
humanity values the integrity of the atmosphere and will make sacrifices to protect its utility.
125. ISS experiments have led to advances in treatments for osteoporosis and muscular
pathologies, as well as the cardiovascular side-effects from radiation exposure, a fatal byproduct of
long-term space travel currently preventing us from becoming a multiplanetary species. Comm. on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of Rep. of Sci. & Tech. Subcomm. on Its Thirty-Fifth Session,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/697, at 28 (1998).
The technology behind the Canadian Space
Agency’s Canadarm2 robotic arm, which captures resupply vessels, is utilized in the removal of
once-inoperable tumors. 15 Ways the International Space Station is Benefitting Earth, NAT’L AERONAUTICS
& SPACE ADMIN. (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/research/news/15
_ways_iss_benefits_earth [https://perma.cc/D877-8F8L].
126. Earth observation satellites impart more precise prediction of natural disasters allowing for
more effective disaster mitigation and evacuation planning. NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
supra note 125.
127. See generally Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of Sci. & Tech. Subcomm.
on Its Fiftieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.330 (2013) (reporting the active and planned
satellite missions tracking near-Earth objects).
128. Planetary Resources’ ARKYD satellite platform mission seeks to identify the composition
of resources on near-Earth asteroids. The ARKYD Spacecraft Development Platform, PLANETARY
RESOURCES (2015) https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3273&context=sm
allsat [https://perma.cc/47V9-NAVF].
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members of the global community.129 If we do not begin active
decontamination and mitigation of space debris, the utility of geospace will
cease to exist. Imagining our existence without these advances is a potent
method to stress the criticality of unabated pollution in geospace.
B. Existing Proposals
Legal scholars have formulated several frameworks to mitigate space
debris. Some recommend implementing a market-share liability regime,
which assigns liability according to the volume of each nation-states’
exploits.130 Opponents of this construction rightfully highlight the
inequities inherent in such a scheme. Considering the United States, Russia,
and China make up the bulk of spacefaring activity, market-share liability
would unduly burden these nations, and coerce a categorical exit from the
space industry or a repeat of the Moon Treaty.131 Another scholar
advocates for an environmental law approach, asserting that the space
commons would benefit from a protocol closely mirroring the Madrid
Protocol.132 While prospective applications of such a model could prevent
additional accumulations, it would not feasibly abate the current collection
of debris.133 The strengths of Mary Button’s mitigation proposal lie in the
binding nature of the Madrid Protocol and compulsory environmental
impact requirements. And though it advocates for a more collaborative
conference mechanism, rather than the strict unanimous consent required
of UNCOPUOS’s resolutions, it still shies away from compulsory
129. See, e.g., G.A. Res. A/RES/61/110, United Nations Platform for Space-Based Information
for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (Jan. 15, 2007) (implementing UN-SPIDER to
foster satellite information sharing with developing nations to increase disaster mitigation capacities).
130. E.g., Peter L. Limperis, Note, Orbital Debris and the Spacefaring Nations: International Law
Methods for Prevention and Reduction of Debris, and Liability Remines for Damage Cause by Debris, 15 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 319, 342 (1998).
131. Cf. Landry, supra note 6, at 525 (“No state or private entity has been willing to bear the
enormous cost of commercialization in part because international law prohibits nation and, potentially,
private appropriation, and even if the laws are interpreted to allow private appropriate, they require
private entities to share some unclear quantity of returns (‘benefits’) with every state on Earth.”).
132. Button, supra note 3, at 563 (proffering that the compulsory environmental impact
assessment framework of the Madrid Protocol could act as a viable enforcement mechanism for any
planning space launch).
133. The Madrid Protocol obligates parties to remove the waste attributable to their activity in
Antarctica. Madrid Protocol, supra note 18, at annex III & art. 1. In geospace, despite the Registration
Convention, debris smaller than ten centimeters cannot be tracked or identifiably connected to a
responsible party, yet still has the potential to start a destructive chain reaction. Space Waste & Debris,
supra note 75.
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requirements for active debris removal. Along with the Antarctic Treaty
(ATS), the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) also served as a model for the Corpus
Juris Spatialis. But oddly, the law of salvage was omitted from the treaties.
Unlike abandoned objects at sea, once a nation-state places an object into
space, ownership exists in perpetuity. Sandra Drago addressed removing
the OST’s property-in-perpetuity mechanism134 so as to permit the active
salvage of inoperable satellites.135 Drago’s proposal is vital to any
mitigation framework. But while this removes a substantial bar currently
restricting debris removal, it does not address free-riding, and spacefaring
enterprises are free to choose more lucrative space activities other than
salvage operations.136
C. A Coercive Proposal
Mutual coercion lies at the core of Hardin’s solution.137 To summarize,
law-abiding citizens make concessions to regulatory social constructs in the
interest of conserving some utility otherwise lost.138 The coercive element
lies in relinquishing one’s ability to exploit some freedom, the detriment of
which cannot be realized at that moment in time.139 Conceding to a regime
that tempers free exploitation of the commons allows everyone to benefit
from the positive externalities of individual usage. Equated to space,
nation-states currently concede to non-appropriation in the interest of
maintaining equitable access. But because of the sui generis nature of
geospace, even non-participants receive a benefit from the use of the
134. See Emily M. Nevala, Waste in Space: Remediating Space Debris Through the Doctrine of
Abandonment and the Law of Capture, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1495, 1520 n.160 (2017) (“Article VIII of the
Outer Space Treaty allows jurisdiction and control over space objects so long as they remain in space,
but at the same time it seems to grant ownership rights in perpetuity.”).
135. Sandra Drago, Note, No Man’s Sky: Utilizing Maritime Law to Address the Need for Space Debris
Removal Technology, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 389, 419 (2019).
136. Cf. id. at 419–21 (discussing salvage awards as an incentive to clean up space debris). One
sharp criticism to Drago’s proposal is the promise of SpaceX’s innovation. If anything, SpaceX is
exacerbating the danger of debris proliferation with the StarLink satellite internet constellation. Apart
from SpaceX, the Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015 authorized the commercial
recovery of asteroid resources as long as such is acquired in accordance with the OST, which will prove
lucrative with the requisite technological capabilities. Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act
of 2015, Pub. L. 114-90, 129 Stat. 721, 722 (disclaiming any extension of extraterritorial sovereignty
implicated through activities authorized by the act).
137. Hardin, supra note 6, at 1247.
138. Id. at 1248.
139. See Demsetz, supra note 114, at 349 (“It is the prohibition of a property right adjustment,
the prohibition of the establishment of an ownership title that can henceforth be exchanged, that
precludes the internalization of external costs and benefits.”).
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commons. In effect, beneficiaries are free-riding from the capital
investment of spacefaring nations and entities. This informs the structure
of the ensuing two-part framework: geospace delimitation and global
liability.
1.

Geospace Delimitation

The history of regulatory delimitation illustrates its effectiveness at
balancing the rights of individuals, sovereigns, and mankind. Each instance
explained in Part II infra, arose out of public necessity to ensure and protect
the maximum utility of the global commons, without the deleteriousness of
inhabitability, sovereign interference, or over-exploitation.140 The regimes
governing Antarctica, the High Seas, the Atmosphere, and the
radio-frequency spectrum evidence that mutually coercive delimitation can
honor the common heritage of mankind, without encroaching on the
peaceful enjoyment and benefits attributable to these areas.
a.

Antarctica

In the 1950s, there was concern that Antarctica would succumb to
Cold War hysteria, becoming a target for international discord and nuclear
arms testing.141 In a move to reestablish global scientific exchange, the
international scientific community hosted the International Geophysical
Year project, and after identifying the potential of Antarctica, sought to
protect it from any ruinous power posturing.142 This necessity for
regulating permissible activity resulted in the formation of the ATS.143
Subsequent technological advancement revealed mineral deposits, triggering
140. Part of Garrett Hardin’s thesis emphasizes necessity as the catalyst for regulatory solutions:
Every new enclosure of the commons involves the infringement of somebody’s personal liberty.
Infringements made in the distant past are accepted because no contemporary complains of a
loss. It is the newly proposed infringements that we vigorously oppose; cries of “rights” and
“freedom: fill the air. But what does “freedom” mean? When men mutually agreed to pass laws
against robbing, mankind became more free, not less so. Individuals locked into the logic of the
commons are free only to bring on universal ruin; once they see the necessity of mutual coercion,
they become free to pursue other goals.
Hardin, supra note 6, at 1248.
141. Seven countries have attempted to claim sovereignty over Antarctica, but these claims were
suspended at the conclusion of the ATS. Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance,
Antarctic Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/193967.htm [https://perma.
cc/78VE-4LLA].
142. Id.
143. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
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commercial interest in exploiting its natural resources. The threat catalyzed
the promulgation of the Madrid Protocol.144 Again, these delimitations did
not sever humanity’s utility in Antarctica. Rather, mankind conceded to the
prohibition of deleterious usage in the interest of preserving its scientific
utility.145
b.

The High Seas

Similar to Antarctica, the High Seas faced threats in the 1960s when
nation-states began unilaterally and arbitrarily, extending resource recovery
activities further into the depths of international waters.146 In the interest
of equity, particularly the interests of landlocked nations, UNCLOS
delimited sovereign access to the seas, allowing usage only within the
established exclusive economic zones (EEZs).147 An annex to UNCLOS
provided a procedural framework in which resource recovery enterprises
could operate in international common areas beyond the EEZs, precluding
the unilateral capture of global resources by one nation.148 Once more, a
mutually coercive framework removed certain freedoms in the interest of
mankind without unjustly limiting equitable access to resources.
c.

The Atmosphere

Divergent from the problems of the ice and sea, atmospheric regulation
resolved an issue more analogous to geospace debris proliferation.
Atmospheric utility is quite simple: breathable air and protection from
deadly cosmic radiation. When satellite imagery revealed the sizable hole in
the ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention placed an

144. Madrid Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 7.
145. Antarctica’s frozen territory contains a time capsule of in situ climate data, playing
a valuable role in climate change models.
Why Study Antarctica?, ANTARCTICA N.Z.,
http://www.antarcticanz.govt.nz/science/why-study-antarctica/ [https://perma.cc/N3SU-N78A].
The Madrid Protocol provisions contain conservation mechanisms, such as compulsory environmental
impact assessment requirements for planned expeditions to the region. Madrid Protocol, supra note 18,
at art. 3.
146. Ian Hedges, Note, How the Rest was Won: Creating a Universally Beneficial Legal Regime for
Space-Based Natural Resource Utilization, 40 VT. L. REV. 365, 384–85 (2015).
147. UNCLOS, supra note 36, at pt. V art. 57.
148. G.A. Res. 48/263, supra note 83. It should be noted that this annex remains unratified by
the United States for the same reasons the Moon Treaty failed. Law of the Sea Convention, U.S. STATE
DEPT. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.state.gov/law-of-the-sea-convention/ [https://perma.cc/45ZWTU57]. Sovereign claims to tangible natural resources in global common areas remains a contentious
issue.
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outright ban on ozone-depleting chemicals in everyday consumables.149
This prohibition directly addressed the source of the negative externality,
forcing humanity to internalize the externality through alternate investment
in refrigerants. Recent evidence of the reduction of ozone loss validates the
mutually coercive delimitation within the Montreal Protocol.150
d.

Regulating the Telecommunication Spectrum

The business model and financial strategy of telecommunications entities
influence satellite deployment planning. Typically, orbital placement aims
to “maximize [a] potential user base,” and if that base happens to
encompass, for instance, the continental United States, market competition
drastically narrows the availability of slots for satellite positioning.151
Realizing that satellite acquisition becomes moot without conscientious “use
of telemetry and control . . . required for spaceflight,”152 the Space
Radiocommunication Conference convened to revise the Radio Regulations
in 1963,153 granting the ITU authority to allocate radio frequencies among
spacefaring entities.154 Originally, the ITU:
[A]llocated orbits and frequencies solely through a first-in-time system. This
led to concern that developed countries would secure all of the available slots
before developing countries had the technological capacity to use them.
Although some orbits and frequencies are still allocated on a first-in-time
basis, each state is now guaranteed a certain number of future orbits and
frequencies, regardless of its current technological capacity.155

149. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, T.I.A.S.
No. 89-101, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.
150. Though difficult to ascertain whether the reduction of ozone loss directly resulted from
ozone-depleting chemical prohibition, such should not discount the international community’s
compliance with production phase-out measures.
Michael Carlowicz, Measurements Show
Reduction in Ozone-Eating Chemicals, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/91694/measurements-show-reduction-in-ozone-eatingchemical [https://perma.cc/T3EY-CUHY].
151. Roberts, supra note 66, at 1102. For example, NOAA’s GOES satellites provide weather
information and can act as a rescue beacon. Three Classes of Orbit, supra note 68.
152. Doyle, supra note 37, at 12–13.
153. Radio Conference on Space Communications: Rewarding Results, 30 TELECOMM. J. 366, 366 (1963).
154. The frequency at which space craft, satellites, and other object can operate without
disruptive interference is limited. Overview of ITU’s History, ITU 2 (Jan. 3, 2019), http://search.itu.int/
history/HistoryDigitalCollectionDocLibrary/12.28.71.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQ2P-S24F].
155. SPRANKLING, supra note 113, at 191.
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The FCC regulates the segment of the electromagnetic spectrum allocated
to the United States.156 Arguably, the ITU and agencies like the FCC
engage in de facto appropriation of the more highly sought-after orbits.157
Yet to an extent, the ITU’s delimiting of the radio-frequency spectrum
remedied the negative externalities of non-appropriation in geospace, such
as the overcrowding of active satellites and the resultant interference. Where
the ITU’s scheme does not remedy the byproduct of geospace resource use,
it succeeds in ensuring communication capabilities remain free from
inequitable use.158
e.

The OST’s Ineffective Delimitations

The recurrent theme among the aforementioned regulatory schemes is
the preservation of utility within the commons concerned.159 The
frameworks each provide a means to enjoy shared resources while removing
the potential for destruction. The OST’s nonproliferation provisions
properly regulate the usage of the space commons to further the enjoyment
of space’s true utility: scientific discovery and telecommunications.
Likewise, the Liability Convention reinforces the necessity to maintain
heightened situational awareness to guarantee the mutual, uninterrupted
But nation-states exploit the
enjoyment of activity in space.160
loop-holes within these documents to avoid internalizing some of their
externalities. Specifically, the Liability Convention only assigns liability
for damage caused to space objects when fault can actually be

156. 47 C.F.R. § 25.108 (2019).
157. Rob Frieden, Balancing Equity and Efficiency Issues in the Management of Shared Global
Radiocommunication Resources, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 289, 321 (2003).
158. See Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Const. art. 1(2)(a), adopted by Plenipotentiary Conference
(Minneapolis, 1998) (“[ITU] shall . . . effect allocation of bands of the radio-frequency spectrum, the
allotment of radio frequencies and the registration of radio-frequency assignments and, for space
services, of any associated orbital position in the geostationary-satellite orbit or of any associated
characteristics of satellites in other orbits, in order to avoid harmful interference[.]”).
159. One could argue that minerals are the true utility of Antarctica. This view fails to realize
that those resources simply remain because the consultative parties have yet to reach a consensus on
an equitable framework for mining enterprises. The utility of a commons protected under the common
heritage of mankind principle requires equitable benefit sharing. So, the delimitation of resource usage
in Antarctica merely operates to prohibit remorseless extraction of shared resources. Hardin, supra
note 6, at 1244.
160. See Liability Convention, supra note 52, at pmbl. (“Recalling the [OST], . . .
[and r]ecognizing the need to elaborate effective international rules and procedures concerning liability
for damage caused by space objects[.]”).
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determined.161 Though it would be simple to assign fault to a collision
caused by an intact and inoperative satellite, it is virtually impossible to
identify the owner of smaller pieces of debris. Further, while the ITU
reserves slots for nations not represented in space,162 it does nothing to
stop those capable of reaching geospace from littering the commons and
destroying the utility of reserved slots.163 Holistically, none of the
delimitations in the Corpus Juris Spatialis negate the cause of the growing belt
of debris in geospace.
As a sui generis resource, the mere occupation of LEO or GSO equates to
the reduction of the overall utility of geospace. When an entity launches a
rocket into space, the accompanying payload causes either (1) temporary
reduction of the aggregate utility of geospace or (2) permanent reduction of
the aggregate utility of geospace.164
The first delimitation prong will recommend bifurcating the applicability
of the Corpus Juris Spatialis, with separate regimes for outer space and
geospace. While the commercialization of outer space is not overly injurious
to the international commons or interests of developing nations, the
overcrowding of affluent spacefaring entities vying for orbital acquisition
puts immense pressure on the finite resources within geospace. Therefore,
demarcating the upper limit of geospace will allow entities to continue
exploring the universe without imposing the restrictions placed on those
seeking geospace positioning.165 This modification will allow continued
161. Id. at art. III. Article II assigns absolute liability for “damage caused by its space object on
the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight,” which adequately addresses space debris on reentry. Id.
at art. II.
162. SPRANKLING, supra note 113, at 191.
163. See Tyler A. Way, The Space Gap, Access to Technology, and the Perpetuation of Poverty, 5 INT’L
RESEARCHSCAPE J. no. 7, 2018, at *3–4 (discussing a 2017 study of the Union of Concerned Scientists
which found that for every satellite a developing nation launched, the United States, China, and Russia
launched three satellites in aggregate). In the event that international cooperation cannot convene an
agreement to promulgate a binding mitigation regime, the value of a developed nation’s reserved orbital
slots are substantially devalued. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Law and Economics, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 411, 412 (1977) (arguing for legal enforcement of gratuitous promises because to do
otherwise significantly decreases the value and overall utility of a promise).
164. Most of the material jettisoned from rocket stages fall back to Earth, burning up in the
atmosphere on re-entry, but not all. Space Waste & Debris, supra note 75.
165. It is pertinent that there be language permitting additional bifurcations, should it ever
become necessary. For instance, the imminent James Webb Space Telescope, the successor of the
Hubble Space Telescope, will be placed at the second Lagrange point, an orbital position that fixes the
telescope in the shadows of the Moon so Earth blocks the Sun, keeping mission-critical infrared
instruments from overheating. Comparison: Webb vs Hubble Telescope, NASA, https://jwst.nasa.gov/
content/about/comparisonWebbVsHubble.html [https://perma.cc/DRR3-LZM6].
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use of both regions, but coerce more sustainable usage of geospace with the
assistance of the secondary prong below.
2.

Global Liability

Operating under the theory that humanity holds an implied property right
in the global commons but limited under the non-appropriation clause to
protect those interests through traditional property mechanisms, the logical
alternative is to impose liability on actions violative of the global interest.166
Further, assuming humanity collectively benefits from utilization of this
commons, then humanity likewise must internalize the cost of the negative
externalities imposed.167 This means that spacefarers, as members of the
global collective, hold both the right and obligation to protect that right for
others.168 Therefore, anyone utilizing or benefitting from the utilization of
the geospace commons has an equitable duty to ensure its sustainability.
Under traditional tort theories, when one has a duty, breach of that duty
causally linked to a measurable injury is actionable. In terms of the duty to
humanity when utilizing geospace, the culmination of Kessler Syndrome
represents the measurable injury.
Kessler informed the scientific community in 1970 of the probable
cataclysmic chain-reaction and destructive conclusion of unabated geospace
This theory, reiterated consistently since its
debris pollution.169

166. Under Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s property and liability rules, a nuisance
claim under property regimes entitles the interest holder the grant of injunction; liability rules allow the
nuisance to continue but requires a payment of damages to the injured party. James E. Krier & Stewart
J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 442–
43 (1995).
167. The collective right to share in the benefits of a global commons comes with a reciprocal
obligation:
[T]he common heritage of mankind principle is not solely about benefit sharing. [It] is just as
much about conservation and preservation. The principle is about solidarity; solidarity in the
preservation and conservation of a good we all share and therefore should protect. But also
solidarity in ensuring that this good, which we all share, is for all our benefit.
Aline Jaeckel et al., Conserving the Common Heritage of Mankind – Options for the Deep-Seabed Mining Regime,
78 MARINE POL’Y 150, 150 (2017) (quoting D. Tladi, The Common Heritage of Mankind and the Proposed
Treaty on Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: The Choice Between Pragmatism and Sustainability,
25 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 113 (2015)).
168. Id.
169. Theoretically, even if we stopped traveling to space, Kessler Syndrome could still
materialize without active reduction of existing debris. See Kessler & Cour-Palais, supra note 92, at 2642
(“With time, enough collisional fragments could be produced to become important in producing new
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dissemination, materialized in 2009.170 Fundamentally, every spacefaring
entity and approving launching state knows of this monumental threat to
the utility of geospace. Yet to date, mitigation guidelines remain
non-binding, and four-figure satellite constellations continue to receive
approval.171 To incorporate a time-honored risk calculation method, the
Hand Formula is instructive and evidences a trend toward unapologetic
endangerment to the utility of geospace in isolation of the associated tort
regime.
Let us assume the burden to mitigate space debris is $18.5 million172 but
the probable magnitude of not mitigating the accumulation of space debris
equates to reverting our technological capabilities back to the 1800s.
Considering the accumulation of debris from the accidental or intentional
breakup of geospace satellites, the probability of Kessler Syndrome fully
concluding in the absence of a comprehensive mitigation protocol is one
hundred percent.173 While difficult to quantify, the value of our scientific
progress attributable to the advent of space travel far outstrips the burden
to mitigate space debris. Should Kessler Syndrome become our reality, the
measurable injury is the cost of reestablishing global communications
without the usage of satellite relays. To add insult to injury, the invaluable
utility of geospace will cease to exist.
A viable alternative would institute a regime of shared global liability
which makes consideration of capital investors as well as nonparticipating
beneficiaries in the interest of equity. That is, should the inevitable prison

collisional fragments. When these conditions apply, the number of objects will increase exponentially
with time, even though no new objects may be place into orbit by man.”).
170. The IRIDIUM 33 and COSMOS 2251 collision marked the first accidental collision,
though several malfunctioning satellites have previously exploded. Additionally, a Chinese anti-satellite
test created intentional debris in 2007. By May 2010, ten separate incidents produced 7,903 pieces of
trackable debris, with thousands more too small to catalogue. The fact that accidental collisions are
occurring within a four year margin of Kessler’s prediction is chilling. NASA’s Orbital Debris Program
Office, Top Ten Satellite Breakups, 14 ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, no. 3, at 2–3 (2010).
171. See supra, text accompanying note 72.
172. Launched in March 2018, European Space Agency’s RemoveDEBRIS satellite, the first to
test debris removal technology, cost $18.5 million. Tony Reichhardt, SpaceX Cargo Ship Will Carry First
Test of Space Debris Cleanup, AIR & SPACE (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.airspacemag.com/dailyplanet/first-test-space-debris-cleanup-about-get-under-way-180968631/ [https://perma.cc/2STJ-AU
3Z].
173. See Kessler & Cour-Palais, supra note 92, at 2642 (“With time, enough collisional fragments
could be produced to become important in producing new collisional fragments. When these
conditions apply, the number of objects will increase exponentially with time, even though no new
objects may be place into orbit by man.”).
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for humanity become a reality, the entire global community will be liable to
pay an equitable share of the overall cost of recovery efforts.174 The
Liability Convention should undergo a similar trifurcation, adding this new
scheme to the current strict and absolute liability mechanisms.175 As such,
shared global liability will consider the responsibility of nation-states and
private entities in isolation.176 This will coerce cooperation among all
agencies, nations, and private entities because the equitable share of
responsibility will drive collective resolution.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the emerging global sentiments regarding environmental
conservation and sustainability, instituting a regime that clearly defines a
legal consequence in the event of environmental ruin boasts greater coercive
force than non-binding resolutions. It appropriately delimits the permissible
uses of geospace without removing any level of utility appurtenant to the
geospace commons. It allows all activity to continue, but with a measurable
consequence that will influence behavior, which will flow positively to all of
mankind. This international agreement aligns with the universal value that
the international community places on the utility of geospace.177 In

174. To clarify, this will not be the holistic cost of restoring the full utility of geospace to a tabula
rasa, but certainly the cost of reestablishing a workable communications network and recovery
program. Additionally, special allowances will be afforded to entities whom actively participate in the
research and development of mitigation and sustainable technology, such as the ESA, for its efforts
with RemoveDEBRIS and SpaceX for its reusable rocket platform. Reichhardt, supra note 172. Ideally,
for the least developed nations, equitable solutions beyond the scope of this Comment would balance
the benefits received and level of involvement in space technology endeavors.
175. The outcome of the Iridium-Cosmos incident is unclear principally due to the flexibility of
the Liability Convention’s fault regime. See generally von der Dunk, supra note 12 (discussing the
difficulties of assigning liability for satellite collision due to vagaries within the Liability Convention
and failure to comply with the Registration Convention).
176. At current, liability is determined by identifying the “launching state” responsible for a
particular space object. Liability Convention, supra note 52, art. I(c). Accordingly, a nation-state is
responsible for any space object launched from its jurisdiction, subject to indemnity and liability
waivers that are beyond the scope of this Comment. But, removing the shield of the state will further
coerce private entities to actively remedy the debris crisis.
177. Interestingly, the ISS provides no direct monetary revenue and all capital investment is a
sunk cost. The return on investment is not represented in financial gain but the scientific discoveries
realized from the activities within. This evidences that it is not unrealistic to assume that the global
community will allocate funds for debris mitigation. Though a categorically sunk cost, our investment
secures our continued enjoyment of the geospace commons for generations to come. The
technological advancement likely to flow from this focus bolsters the argument that complete
ratification is possible.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss3/6

36

Vollmer: The Right Stuff in Geospace

2020]

COMMENT

813

essence, it protects geospace by forcing the signatory to face the reality of
their negative externalities. It is unlikely that a nation-state exists that does
not value space exploration and the benefits attributable.
In April of 2019, in the spirit of the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), COPUOS adopted an agenda that focused on the long-term
sustainability of the space commons, space traffic management, equitable
uses of GSO, and the mitigation of space debris.178 Mindful of space’s
critical role in attaining many of the SDGs, the Committee put forth
guidelines to facilitate capacity building without prejudice to any one
nation-states’ economic capabilities. To be sure, the Guidelines for the
Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities are an important step
forward, but many delegates reiterated the importance of developing
binding instruments, particularly in light of developments in “space resource
exploitation, large constellations, and space debris remediation.”179
Looking forward, research continues to advance the availability of debris
mitigation mechanisms, such as the European Space Agency’s
Mission objectives
newly-commissioned ClearSpace-1 satellite.180
increasingly include end-of-life procedures to place satellites in appropriate
orbits to decrease clutter in areas where active satellites operate.181 In the
context of private entities, Planetary Resources—originally positioned to
become a principle player in the space mining industry—merged with
Consensys Space and quickly launched TruSat, a crowd-sourced situational
awareness forum that compiles the reports of private citizens to track
objects in geospace.182 These developments instill confidence in the
international community’s sentiments toward ameliorating this
178. COPUOS, Sixty-Second, supra note 4.
179. See id. at 26 (“[A]lthough non-legally binding instruments had been a success in that they
had guided States in conducting their activities in outer space in a safe and secure manner, they should
not replace treaties and custom as the valuable sources of international law that they are.”).
180. ESA Commissions World’s First Space Debris Removal, EUR. SPACE AGENCY (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Clean_Space/ESA_commissions_world_s_first_space_debris_
removal [https://perma.cc/JU4M-C4DS].
181. The ITU now requires that satellites commence transition into decay or graveyard orbits
at the end of its functional life, a principle echoed in the ODMSP standards. Recommendation ITU-R
S.1003-2, at 1 (Dec. 2010).
182. TruSat as a Space Sustainability Tool, CONSENSYS SPACE: TRUSAT, https://learn.trusat.org/
docs/space-sustainability [https://perma.cc/L6UQ-QBCF] (“Private commercial providers of SSA
data rely on satellite operators for their revenue and do not have incentives for calling out nonconforming orbital behavior. TruSat is designed to fill this gap through a new approach to SSA
uncoupled from government or commercial interests.”). Anyone with an augmented-reality-equipped
smart phone can contribute to TruSat’s mission.
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ever-approaching catastrophe. It is with great hope that this trend
continues, and COPUOS promulgates binding regulations to ensure the
sustainability of geospace for the common heritage of mankind. “But we
can never do nothing. That which we have done for thousands of years is
also action. It also produces evils.”183

183. Hardin, supra note 6, at 1247.
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VI. APPENDIX

NASA rendering of space debris. The objects obscuring Earth are those
in LEO. The faint outer line represents objects in the geosynchronous orbit
subtype of geostationary orbit.184

184. NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Space Debris, NAT’L AERONAUTICS &
SPACE ADMIN. (Sept. 11, 2009), https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/40173/space-debris
[https://perma.cc/X3S6-FKR9].
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